Nice. Don’t really watch most of these shows regularly or feel passionately about them, but that amused me.

Hackers is not a good movie.

James, I knew that was the point you were trying to make because you’ve made it to me before, but I disagree with you. The acting here is not good (the definition of “good” I’m using is realistic). Part of the problem, in terms of the scene being realistic, is certainly the dialogue. Part of the problem also lies with the acting. Just to clarify, even though you feel the scene linked to is good independent of nostalgia or camp, do you agree that the scene is in fact both nostalgic and campy?

And I love it.

-TC

But this simply isn’t what “intend” means! If I tell you tonight that I intend to arrive at dinner on time tomorrow, but then on my way over I get hit by a car (and therefore don’t make it to dinner at all), you can’t claim that I didn’t actually intend to be on time. Intention refers to a plan, and plans are subject to change.

Note that I never said it would be easy to intend (totally and without qualification) to drink the poison at T0 but actually back out at T1. I made a point of describing just how fucked up you’d have to be to pull it off—either because you have bizarre memory problems, or because you’re paranoid and delusional, or because you’re self-destructive, or because you honestly believe you can bind your future self no matter what.

What I mean when I say this isn’t really a puzzle, then, is that it’s not philosophically difficult in the way that Newcomb’s problem is, at least when you interpret intention in its regular everyday sense.

Regarding Hackers, I know you’re not exactly saying this here, but you must realize that the movie, and the scene you’ve picked out, is campy and nostalgic. I don’t think you’re being fair with Hackers. You turn an appropriately critical eye toward these other shows but then let Hackers off the hook.

The schemes you propose may creep close to genuine intention, but I think that on Kavka’s view (not that I’ve actually read his paper), your knowing at T0 that, as you put it, “of course odds are that the next day you’d go back on your word” prevents you from truly intending to drink the poison. In order to truly intend, you need to completely eliminate all possibility of not following through. That is, you need to actually follow through.

I think Newcomb’s problem elucidates the strictness of this type of genuine intentionality. In the formulation of the problem I’m familiar with, the eccentric billionaire nearly always guesses right: regardless of the machinations people employ, nearly all of those who 2-box (regardless of how many boxes they intended to select at T0) end up with the disappointing payoff.

One explanation of the millionaire’s accuracy in this version of Newcomb’s problem might be that the millionaire is a sufficiently powerful demon (of Laplace’s variety) who (1) defines intentionality as your having at T0 one of a certain set of brain states that correspond to your 1-boxing at T1 and (2) knows when you have one of these brain states and when you do not. You might say that what you will do at T1 leaves a residue in your mind at T0, and the demon puts money in the boxes based on the presence or absence of this residue. Therefore, the only way to intend to 1-box at T0 (and thereby get the higher payoff) is to actually 1-box at T1.

Perhaps Kavka thinks it’s impossible to have “gain without pain” in his situation because he’s operating under this strict definition of “intention?”